Tabrizi v. Faxton-St. Luke’s Health Care (Full Text)

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1102
CA 08-02627
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., HURLBUTT, MARTOCHE, SMITH, AND CENTRA, JJ.

IN THE MATTER OF FIROOZ N. TABRIZI, M.D.,
PETITIONER-APPELLANT,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
V

FAXTON-ST. LUKE’S HEALTH CARE,
RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.

PETER M. HOBAICA, LLC, UTICA (GEORGE E. CURTIS OF COUNSEL), FOR
PETITIONER-APPELLANT.
NAPIERSKI, VANDENBURGH & NAPIERSKI, LLP, ALBANY (KIMBERLY E. KENEALY
OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Oneida County (John W.
Grow, J.), entered September 30, 2008. The order denied petitioner’s
application for an injunction pursuant to Public Health Law § 2801-c.
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is
unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Petitioner (hereafter, plaintiff) commenced this
CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to compel respondent (hereafter,
defendant) to reinstate his full clinical privileges at defendant’s
hospital. Supreme Court converted the proceeding into an action for
an injunction pursuant to Public Health Law § 2801-c and then refused
to grant an injunction, concluding that there was a rational basis for
the suspension and that plaintiff had been afforded his full
procedural rights pursuant to the applicable law and defendant’s
bylaws. We affirm.
Upon reviewing an application for an injunction pursuant to
Public Health Law § 2801-c, the court’s inquiry is limited to
determining whether the purported grounds for suspending or
restricting a physician’s practice privileges “were reasonably related
to the institutional concerns set forth in the statute, whether they
were based on the apparent facts as reasonably perceived by the
administrators, and whether they were assigned in good faith” (Fried v
Straussman, 41 NY2d 376, 383, rearg denied 41 NY2d 1009; see Bhard-Waj
v United Health Servs., Hosps., 303 AD2d 824, 825; Jones v Yonkers
Gen. Hosp., 143 AD2d 885). It is not within the province of the court
to determine whether a defendant was in fact justified in suspending
the plaintiff’s clinical privileges or whether the allegations against
the plaintiff were in fact accurate (see Fried, 41 NY2d at 382-383).

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1102
CA 08-02627
Based on the record before us, including the transcript of plaintiff’s
fair hearing, we agree with the court that defendant’s reasons for
suspending plaintiff’s clinical privileges were properly related to
the concern of defendant for the safety of its patients (see § 2801-b
[1]). In addition, defendant’s actions were undertaken in good faith,
i.e., in response to a telephone call from a physician affiliated with
an insurance company who expressed concern over plaintiff’s care of a
patient insured by that company.
We reject plaintiff’s contention that the court improperly
dismissed the action, sua sponte, in the absence of a motion to
dismiss by defendant. Although the court in its bench decision stated
that the action was dismissed, the court also stated that it was
denying “injunctive relief.” In any event, having denied the relief
sought in the action, it is of no moment whether the court stated in
its bench decision that the action was dismissed.

Entered: October 2, 2009

Patricia L. Morgan
Clerk of the Court