Lewis v. Grady Memorial Hosp. Corp., Inc. — Feb. 2017 (Summary)

CHARITABLE IMMUNITY

Lewis v. Grady Mem’l Hosp. Corp., Inc.
A16A1877 (Ga. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2017)

The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed a lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a hospital, holding that the hospital was not entitled to charitable immunity as a matter of law since genuine issues of material fact remain regarding whether the hospital extended charity to the patient-plaintiff and whether the patient comes within the paying patient exception to the charitable immunity doctrine.

The patient filed a complaint against the hospital alleging that the hospital was liable for the sexual assault and battery committed upon her because a hospital employee failed to properly monitor the hallway leading to the patient’s room and, as a result, another patient was able to enter her room and assault her.  The hospital filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the patient’s claims were precluded against it based on charitable immunity.  The lower court granted the motion and the patient appealed.

The appeals court explained that a charitable institution is not liable for negligence unless it fails to exercise ordinary care, but there is an exception – when a patient is not the recipient of charity, but pays for services and is injured because of negligence, the institution is liable.

In this case, after being admitted to the hospital, the patient executed a form providing that she was financially responsible for any charges not covered by her insurance plan.  During this time, the patient was employed and had health insurance through her employer.  The patient believed that her health insurance would pay for her treatment, but when the hospital submitted a claim for payment, for reasons unknown, the insurer denied the claim leaving an outstanding balance of approximately ten thousand dollars.  Subsequently, the patient’s attorney tendered to the hospital the outstanding balance of which the hospital accepted.

The court reasoned that the lower court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment based on its rationale that the patient was not a paying patient because her payment for services was tendered by her attorney.  Also, the court found that a patient who is unable to pay, but whose total expenses are paid by some other source, is not a charity patient because the charges are not borne by the public as an expression of charity.  Thus, the court reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment since the patient’s costs were paid in full and not charitably absorbed by the hospital nor borne by the public as an expression of charity.