September 2003 Term
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No. 31322
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RALEIGH GENERAL HOSPITAL,
Petitioner Below, Appellant
v.
DEBRA CAUDILL,
Respondent Below,
Appellee
______________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Raleigh County
Honorable Robert A.
Burnside, Jr., Judge
Civil Action No. 02-C-25-B
AFFIRMED
_____________________________________________________
Submitted: October 28, 2003
Filed: December 5, 2003
| Daniel T. Booth, Esq. Booth & McCarthy Bridgeport, West Virginia Attorney for Appellant |
John D. Wooton, Esq. Christopher M. Davis, Esq. The Wooton Law Firm Beckley, West Virginia Attorneys for Appellee |
1.
“'“Where the issue on appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law
or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard
of review.” Syllabus point 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va.
138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995).' Syllabus point 2, Coordinating Council for
Independent Living, Inc. v. Palmer, 209 W.Va. 274, 546 S.E.2d 454 (2001).”
Syl. pt. 1, American Tower Corp. v. Common Council of City of Beckley,
210 W.Va. 345, 557 S.E.2d 752 (2001).
2.
“'“'“Where language of a statute is clear and without
ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of
interpretation.” Syllabus Point 2[,] State v. Elder, 152 W.Va. 571, 165
S.E.2d 108 (1968).' Syl. pt. 1, Peyton v. City Council of Lewisburg, 182
W.Va. 297, 387 S.E.2d 532 (1989).” Syl. pt. 3, Hose v. Berkeley County
Planning Commission, 194 W.Va. 515, 460 S.E.2d 761 (1995).' Syl. pt. 2,
Mallamo v. Town of Rivesville, 197 W.Va. 616, 477 S.E.2d 525 (1996).”
Syl. pt. 3, Maikotter v. Univ. of W.Va. Bd. of Trustees, 206 W.Va. 691,
527 S.E.2d 802 (1999).
3.
Under W.Va. Code §48-3-22 (1931), inter
alia, both a husband and wife are liable for the reasonable and necessary
services of a physician rendered to either spouse while residing together as
husband and wife.
McGraw, Justice:
This is an appeal from an
order entered August 22, 2002 in the Circuit Court of Raleigh County, West
Virginia, granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee Debra Caudill,
defendant below, and holding that Appellee is not liable for payment of medical
expenses incurred by her now-deceased husband while he was a patient at
Appellant Raleigh General Hospital. (See footnote 1)
For the reasons discussed
herein, the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee
is affirmed.
On or about August 5, 2001,
Appellant Hospital brought an action in the Magistrate Court of Raleigh County
against Appellee and her husband alleging the couple was jointly and severally
liable for $1,516.48, plus interest, in unpaid medical bills. After Appellee's
husband died, Appellant Hospital continued the civil action against Appellee on
the ground that, under the common law doctrine of necessaries, Appellee had an
implied contract to pay for medical debts incurred by her husband during the
marital relationship.
On August 28, 2001, Appellee
filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to W.Va.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
Thereafter, the case was removed to the Circuit Court of Raleigh County, where a
hearing on Appellee's motion was conducted on April 8, 2002.
By Order entered August 22,
2002, the circuit court ordered that Appellee's motion to dismiss be treated as
a motion for summary judgment, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Hathaway, 183 W.Va. 165, 394 S.E.2d 764 (1990), and further, granted
Appellee's motion, concluding that W.Va. Code §48-3-22
(1931), (See footnote 2) which provided that both
a husband and wife were liable for the reasonable and necessary services of a
physician rendered to either spouse while residing together as husband and wife,
did not also permit recovery by a hospital for other medical debts.
(See footnote 3) Accordingly, the circuit
court concluded Appellee was not liable for her husband's medical debts. It is
from the circuit court's Order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee
that Appellant Hospital now appeals.
[a]ll purchases
hereafter made, or services contracted for, by either husband or wife in his or
her own name, shall be presumed, in the absence of notice to the contrary, to be
on his or her private account and liability; but both are liable for the
reasonable and necessary services of a physician rendered to the husband or wife
while residing together as husband and
wife. . . [.]
(Emphasis added)
Appellee argues that although
the language of W.Va. Code §48-3-22 (1931) clearly imposes liability on
both a husband and wife for the “reasonable and necessary services of a
physician” rendered to either spouse while residing together as husband and
wife, the statute does not apply so as to hold Appellee liable for the medical
debts at issue. We agree.
It is undisputed that
Appellant Hospital seeks to recover the cost of medical supplies used in the
treatment of Appellee's husband. It is further undisputed the medical debts at
issue do not include costs for the services of any physician who treated
Appellee's husband while he was a patient at Appellant Hospital. However,
Appellant Hospital argues that because a patient cannot be admitted to or
treated by a hospital without physician approval, W.Va. Code §48-3-22
(1931) should be construed broadly so as to impose liability on a spouse for
debts incurred during the course of a hospital's treatment of a husband or
wife.
This Court has traditionally followed the principle that “[i]n any search for the meaning or proper application[ ] of a statute, we first resort to the language itself.” Maikotter v. Univ. of W.Va. Bd. of Trustees, 206 W.Va. 691, 696, 527 S.E.2d 802, 807 (1999). As we held in syllabus point 3 of Maikotter,
'“'“Where language of a
statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted
without resorting to the rules of interpretation.” Syllabus Point 2[,] State
v. Elder, 152 W.Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968).' Syl. pt. 1, Peyton v.
City Council of Lewisburg, 182 W.Va. 297, 387 S.E.2d 532 (1989).” Syl. pt.
3, Hose v. Berkeley County Planning Commission, 194 W.Va. 515, 460 S.E.2d
761 (1995).' Syl. pt. 2, Mallamo v. Town of Rivesville, 197 W.Va. 616,
477 S.E.2d 525
(1996).
Furthermore, in
prior cases, we have emphasized that “'[i]t is not for [courts] arbitrarily to
read into [a statute] that which it does not say. Just as courts are not to
eliminate through judicial interpretation words that were purposely included,
we are obliged not to add to statutes something the Legislature purposely
omitted.” Williamson v. Greene, 200 W.Va. 421, 426, 490 S.E.2d 23, 28
(1997) (quoting Banker v. Banker, 196 W.Va. 535, 546-47, 474 S.E.2d 465,
476-77 (1966).). (Emphasis provided)
The language of W.Va. Code §48-3-22 (1931) is clear and unambiguous. Under W.Va. Code §48-3-22 (1931), both a husband and wife are liable for the reasonable and necessary services of a physician rendered to either spouse while residing together as husband and wife. By its express terms, the statute does not impose liability on both spouses for other medical services rendered to the husband or wife, but limits such liability to physicians' services. Because we are constrained by the foregoing rules of statutory construction, we must apply the statute as written. We hold, therefore, that under W.Va. Code §48-3-22 (1931), inter alia, both a husband and wife are liable for the reasonable and necessary services of a physician rendered to either spouse while residing together as husband and wife. As previously stated, the medical debts for which Appellant Hospital seeks payment from Appellee are not for any services of a physician rendered to Appellee's husband while he was a patient at Appellant Hospital; therefore, Appellee is not liable for those debts under W.Va. Code §48-3-22 (1931). (See footnote 4)
In 2001, the statute was amended and reenacted at W.Va. Code §48-29-303. See
Acts of the Legislature (ch. 91, 2001); Discussion, infra.
Footnote: 3