Dr. Raphael Emanuel appeals a summary judgment granted on general grounds in favor of Medical City Dallas Hospital, Inc. (Medical City). He brings three issues for our review. In issues two and three Emanuel contends that summary judgment was improper because Medical City did not conclusively establish that it is entitled to immunity under the Texas or federal statutes. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4495b, § 5.06 (Vernon 1998) FN:2 ; 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11111- 11112 (West Supp. 1999). In his first issue, Emanuel contends Medical City did not present any evidence regarding the discovery rule. We overrule all three issues and affirm the trial court's judgment.
        Emanuel was a physician with staff privileges at Medical City. In Emanuel's 1991 application for reappointment, Medical City learned that Emanuel was being investigated by the Dallas County Medical Society. The Credential Committee tabled Emanuel's application for reappointment pending receipt of further information from the Dallas County Medical Society. Eventually, Emanuel entered into an agreed order with the Dallas County Medical Society. In this order, he agreed he inadvertently utilized the wrong billing codes for pulmonary and vascular testing on patients and agreed to a public reprimand, two years of probation of his medical license and twenty hours of continuing medical education and risk management. After several hearings and reviews, Medical City voted to deny renewal of Emanuel's privileges. At the same time these events were taking place, Emanuel was being considered for the medical director position at Spring Creek Rehabilitation Hospital. Jack Booth, administrator at Spring Creek requested a statement from Medical City that Emanuel was on staff at Medical City. Booth recalls reading a letter from Medical City stating that Emanuel was not on staff. It is undisputed that at the time the letter was sent, Emanuel was on staff at Medical City. The Medical City board of trustees voted to deny Emanuel's medical staff membership on November 15, 1993.
        The federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA) provides immunity from liability to professional review bodies and persons who participate or assist as a member or staff to the body under any federal or state law. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11111(a)(1). To qualify for immunity under the HCQIA, peer review action must be taken:
    (1)     in the reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of quality health care,
    (2)     after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter,

    (3)     after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded to the physician involved or after such other procedures as are fair to the physician under the circumstances, and

    (4)                  in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the facts known after such reasonable effort to obtain facts and after meeting the requirement of paragraph (3).

Id. at § 11112(a). Unless it is rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence, there is a presumption that a professional review action has met the preceding standards. Id.
        In his third issue, Emanuel contends that Medical City did not meet the standards for a “professional review action” as outlined in the HCQIA. He argues (1) Medical City failed to make a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter because it did not independently investigate his situation and (2) the affidavits provided by Medical City did not provide facts that would allow the trial court to determine if the review process complied with the HCQIA's requirements. Although HCQIA does require a medical review committee to make a “reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter,” it does not require Medical City to conduct an independent investigation. See id. at §11112(a)(2). Emanuel failed to bring forth any evidence to rebut the presumption that Medical City's peer review complied with the statute. To the contrary, the evidence shows that Medical City conducted several hearings, a number of which Emanuel and his counsel attended.
        The notice and hearing requirement section of the HCQIA requires a hearing be held “before a panel of individuals who . . . are not in direct economic competition with the physician involved.” Emanuel argues that Medical City failed to comply with this section because three of the individuals on the review panel were in direct economic competition with him. As summary judgment proof, Emanuel provided his own affidavit which names three doctors and states that these doctors “have treated my patients and were in direct competition with me at the time they were appointed.” The trial court excluded these statements. Because the complained of were properly excluded as self-serving, conclusory and unsupported by summary judgment evidence, we conclude the trial court properly excluded the statements. See Grainger v. Western Cas. Life Ins. Co., 930 S.W.2d 609, 615 (Tex.App._Houston [1 Dist.] 1996 writ denied). Emanuel did not provide any other evidence of direct competition. The summary judgment proof is silent on how these doctors were in direct competition with Emanuel. Because compliance is presumed and because there was no proof that individuals on the panel were in direct competition with Emanuel, we overrule Emanuel's third point of error.
        In Emanuel's second issue, he argues Medical City failed to comply with the Texas Medical Practices Act (TMPA). Like the federal statute, the TMPA grants immunity from civil liability to any hospital, person, or professional review body that, without malice, participates in or furnishes records or information to a professional review body. See Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 160.010 (Vernon 2000).
        Emanuel contends there are insufficient facts to establish a “peer review.” We disagree. The TMPA defines “medical peer review” as “the evaluation of medical and health care services, including evaluation of the qualifications of professional health care practitioners and of patient care rendered by those practitioners.” See id. at § 151.002(a)(7). In this case, it is undisputed that Medical City was reviewing Emanuel's application for renewal of his staff privileges. We conclude the credentialing process and review of staff privileges qualifies as medical peer review. See St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1997); Memorial Hosp.-The Woodlands v. McCown, 927 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. 1996).         Emanuel also contends that Medical City failed to establish that it acted without malice. However, there is a presumption of the absence of malice. The burden is on Emanuel to prove malice by a preponderance of the evidence. See Maewal v. Adventist Health Systems/Sunbelt, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 886, 893 (Tex. App._Fort Worth 1993, no writ).
        As summary judgment proof of malice, Emanuel offered his own affidavit stating that a doctor told him “you are being made a precedent.” The trial court excluded that portion of Emanuel's affidavit as hearsay. Emanuel argues the trial court erred in excluding this evidence because of the admission by party opponent exception. See Tex. R. Evid. 801(e)(2). However, the doctor who made the statement was not a party to this case. Therefore, the trial court properly excluded that portion of the affidavit as hearsay.
        Emanuel also offered Jack Booth's affidavit establishing the existence of a letter to Spring Creek that wrongly denied Emanuel was in good standing. He contends this letter is proof of malice. Assuming, without deciding, the affidavit is proper summary judgment evidence, the letter in and of itself is insufficient to establish malice. At most, the letter is a misstatement of facts. Without more, it is insufficient to show malice by a preponderance of the evidence.
        Alternatively, Emanuel argues that immunity does not apply to his tortious interference claim because the letter to Spring Creek had nothing to do with the peer review process. We disagree. Under section 160.010(c), immunity not only extends to a person who participates in medical peer review activity, but also to a person who “furnishes records, information, or assistance to a medical peer review committee.” See id. § 160.010(c). Medical City's letter to Spring Creek was sent in response to Spring Creek's review of Emanuel's qualification to serve as a medical director for Spring Creek. As we stated earlier, credentialing and review of staff privileges qualifies as medical review. Because Medical City is entitled to immunity from liability or damages for any federal or state cause of action, we overrule Emanuel's third point of error. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 11111(a) (West Supp.1993); Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 160.010 (Vernon 2000).
        We further reject Emanuel's argument that immunity does not apply to his claim for injunctive relief. He cites to section 161.003 of the Texas Health and Safety Code as authority for this proposition. He argues that this section provides immunity only from damages and not injunctive relief. However, section 161.003 applies only to a member of a medical committee and is inapplicable in this case. As a health care entity, Medical City is entitled to immunity “from any civil liability.” See Tex. Occ. Code Ann. §160.010(c).
        Having determined that Medical City is entitled to immunity under both the Texas and federal statutes, we need not address Emanuel's first issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.
        The summary judgment is affirmed.


                                                          
                                                          DAVID F. FARRIS
                                                          JUSTICE, ASSIGNED

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47

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FN:1
1         The Honorable David F. Farris, Former Justice, Second District Court of Appeals, Fort Worth, Texas, sitting by assignment.

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FN:2
2         Act of June 1, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 596, §18, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 2325, 2335, repealed by Act of May 13, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 388, § 6, 1999 Tex. Ses. Law Serv. 2439 (current version at Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 160.010 (Vernon 2000)). Since the time this cause of action accrued, the legislature has amended and recodified the Texas Medical Practices Act. Because the changes are not substantive, we cite to the current statute for convenience.

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File Date[01/12/2000]
File Name[971273F]
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