Williamson v. Altapointe Health Sys., Inc. (Full Text)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMSON,

Plaintiff,

)

) CIVIL ACTION NO. 08-00284-CB-M

ALTAPOINTE HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC.

Defendant.

)

OPINION and ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment filed by the

Defendant, AltaPointe Health Systems, Inc. (Doc. 21) At issue is whether Plaintiff can present

sufficient evidence of gender discrimination to support the claims raised in the amended

complaint. After considering the undisputed evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the

Court finds that the motion for summary judgment is due to be granted.

Findings of Fact

Defendant Altapointe Health Systems, Inc. (AltaPointe) provides mental healthcare at

multiple locations throughout Mobile and Washington counties. Plaintiff Christopher

Williamson is a physician’s assistant who was employed by AltaPointe1 at BayPointe Hospital,

from May 2006 to February 2007. Williamson applied for a nurse practitioner position with

AltaPointe in order to obtain assistance with repayment of student loans from the National

Health Services Corps (NHSC). To qualify for assistance, Plaintiff had to work for an NHSC-

approved employer for two years. Plaintiff found the position on an NHSC website and

1During the time period relevant to this action, Altapointe did business as “Mobile
Mental Health Center.”

contacted Dr. Sandra Parker, AltaPointe’s medical director. Initially, Dr. Parker had to

determine whether a physician’s assistant could be hired for a nurse practitioner’s position.

Later, Dr. Parker called Williamson and invited him to submit a resume and to come in for an

interview. After the interview, Dr. Parker offered Williamson a position. Williamson was hired

to assist Dr. Doug Ewing, a recently hired psychiatrist, in BayPointe’s Adult Evaluation Unit

(AEU). Williamson’s primary duties involved assisting with adult psychiatric patients in the

AEU.2 Prior to coming to BayPointe, Williamson had no experience working in psychiatric care.

In September 2006, Dr. Parker invited Williamson to attend the “Adult Psychiatric

Institute,” a continuing education program presented by the Alabama Department of Mental

Health and Mental. By attending the seminar Williamson would have been able to obtain annual

continuing medical education (CME) credits needed to maintain his physician’s assistance (PA)

license. Dr. Parker subsequently learned that Williamson had registered for the seminar but had

skipped all or part of it to work his second job as an organ harvester with an organ bank. In

January 2007, Williamson asked Parker to approve his attendance at a five-day PA conference in

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Dr. Parker refused Williamson’s request because the conference did

not focus on psychiatric medicine, which is the area in which Williamson needed training.

During the Fall of 2006, Dr. Parker began to receive complaints from Dr. Ewing

regarding his own workload at the AEU. Specifically, Dr. Ewing felt that involuntary

commitment hearings were taking up too much of his time. Because the AEU was an inpatient

2His duties also included occasionally providing general medical care to patients in
BayPointe’s children’s unit.

unit, it was necessary for AltaPointe to have an experienced psychiatric healthcare professional

at BayPointe who could testify at these hearings. Dr. Ewing was the only psychiatrist at the

AEU, and Williamson was the only PA or nurse practitioner. Dr. Parker did not think

Williamson was qualified to testify at commitment hearings due to his lack of experience in

psychiatric medicine.

Dr. Parker did not want to lose Dr. Ewing, so she began to think of ways of restructuring

that would reduce Dr. Ewing’s workload. Eventually, the plan she came up with involved Dr.

Ewing switching places with Dr. Abordo, a psychiatrist at another AltaPointe facility. Dr.

Abordo worked at Mobile Infirmary where he was assisted by two female nurse practitioners, Pat

Noonan and Julia Trice. Dr. Parker decided to transfer Noonan to BayPointe with Dr. Abordo.

Noonan had an extensive background in psychiatric medicine and had experience testifying at

involuntary commitment hearings. Therefore, Dr. Parker believed that Noonan and Dr. Abordo

could work as a team and share testimonial duties. Williamson was not transferred to Mobile

Infirmary with Dr. Ewing, however, because Dr. Parker decided to eliminate both nurse

practitioner positions at that facility. In place of the two nurse practitioners, Dr. Parker

transferred another psychiatrist, Dr. St. Phard, to Mobile Infirmary. Thus, the workload formerly

handled by one psychiatrist and two nurser practitioners would now be handled by two

psychiatrists. As a result of this restructuring, both Williamson and Trice were discharged.

Williamson’s termination became effective February 6, 2007. He was not discharged on

account of his performance and had, in fact, received good evaluations while employed by

AltaPointe. He also received a positive recommendation from Dr. Parker after his discharge. In

March 2007, Williamson found on the NHSC website listings for nurse practitioner openings at

several AltaPointe facilities, including BayPointe Hospital and Mobile Infirmary. Williamson

did not obtain further information about these openings, nor did he apply for any position with

AltaPointe. He continued to work his second job with an organ bank, and was hired in mid-

March of 2007 by United Surgical Assistants, a non-NHSC approved employer, earning higher

salary than he had earned at AltaPointe. In the Spring of 2008, Williamson received a non-

compliance letter from NHSC and shortly thereafter obtained a job with an NHSC-approved

employer in Montana, earning considerably more than he did at AltaPointe.

Issues Presented

Plaintiff’s amended complaint can be interpreted to assert three claims for gender-based

employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e, et seq. First, he contends that the restructuring and the resulting elimination of his job

was a “ruse” for discrimination, i.e., he was terminated on account of his gender. Second,

Plaintiff complains that he was denied a lateral transfer or part-time position when his job was

eliminated, although he does not specifically assert that this denial was on account of his gender.

Third, Plaintiff asserts that he was treated differently in the terms and conditions of employment

in that he was denied permission to attend CME courses, in contrast to a female employee.

Defendant seeks summary judgment on each of these claims, asserting that Plaintiff

cannot meet his burden of proving intentional discrimination under the familiar McDonnell

Douglas analysis. Plaintiff’s response addresses his termination claim but not his two remaining

claims. It is well-settled that claims not alleged in the complaint but not relied upon in summary

judgment are deemed abandoned. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599

(11th Cir. 1995). For that reason, only the termination claim will be considered on the merits.

All other claims asserted in the complaint have been abandoned and, therefore, are due to be

dismissed with prejudice.

Legal Analysis

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment should be granted only if “there is no issue as to any material fact

and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The

party seeking summary judgment bears “the initial burden to show the district court, by reference

to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at

trial.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). If the nonmoving party

bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party must, at a minimum, “point to specific

portions of the record in order to demonstrate that the nonmoving party cannot meet its burden of

proof at trial. United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1438 n. 19 (11th

Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)) (footnote omitted). If the

moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, it “must show that, on all the essential elements

of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could find for the

nonmoving party.” Id. at 1438. In either situation, if the moving party meets its summary

judgment burden, the non-moving party must come forward with evidence to demonstrate a

triable issue of fact. Id. In reviewing that evidence, “the court must stop short of weighing the

evidence and making credibility determinations of the truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence

of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”

Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 999 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and

quotations omitted).

Title VII Framework

When there is no direct evidence of discriminatory intent in a Title VII employment

discrimination action, courts apply the familiar shifting burdens analysis set forth by the

Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under that

framework, a plaintiff must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination. That prima facie case creates a reable presumption of discrimination. The

defendant must rebut this presumption by proffering a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its

employment decision. If the defendant rebuts the presumption, the plaintiff bears the burden of

proving that the reasons given by the defendant are not the true reasons but are merely a pretext

for discrimination. Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024-25 (11th Cir. 2000) (en

banc). To prove pretext, a plaintiff “must meet the employer’s reason head on and rebut it, and

the employee cannot succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that reason.” Id. at 1030.

Furthermore, “[plaintiff’s] evidence must reveal ‘such weaknesses, implausibilities,

inconsistencies, incoherencies or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons

for its actions that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.’” Vessels v.

Atlanta Ind. School System, 408 F.3d 763, 770 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Cooper v. Southern Co.,

390 F.3d 695, 725 (11th Cir.2004)).

Defendant first challenges Plaintiff’s ability to prove a prima facie case. “A plaintiff

establishes a prima facie case of disparate treatment by showing that [ ]he was a qualified

member of a protected class and was subjected to an adverse employment action in contrast with

similarly situated employees outside the protected class.” Wilson v. B/E Aerospace Inc., 376

F.3d 1079, 1088 (11th Cir. 2004). Defendant points out that there are no similarly situated

employees who were treated more favorably than Plaintiff. Three employees who occupied

nurse practitioner positions were affected by the restructuring–Pat Noonan, Julia Trice and

Plaintiff. Julia Trice was discharged along with Plaintiff. Pat Noonan was retained and

transferred to Plaintiff’s former position. Noonan had considerably more experience in

psychiatric medicine than Plaintiff, had worked closely with Dr. Abordo, the psychiatrist

transferred to BayPointe, and, in contrast to Plaintiff, had the knowledge and expertise to testify

at involuntary commitment hearings. In sum, Noonan cannot be considered similarly situated to

Plaintiff. Because Plaintiff cannot identify a similarly situated female employee who was

retained under similar circumstances, his prima facie case fails.3

Even if Plaintiff could prove a prima facie case of discrimination, he has failed to

overcome Defendant’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s discharge. Dr. Parker

explained that the discharge resulted from the restructuring of the psychiatric staff. The

restructuring came about because of Dr. Ewing’s complaints about the testimonial workload at

BayPointe. To alleviate that problem, Dr. Parker did two things. First, she had Dr. Ewing

switch jobs with Dr. Abordo. Dr. Ewing moved to Mobile Infirmary, and Dr. Abordo went to

BayPointe. Second, Dr. Parker sent Pat Noonan, one of the two nurse practitioners who worked

with Dr. Abordo, to Altapointe (essentially taking Plaintiff’s nurse practitioner position) because

Noonan was capable of sharing the testimonial workload with Dr. Abordo. The restructuring did

not end there. Dr. Parker also decided to eliminate the two nurse practitioner positions at the

Infirmary and replace them with one psychiatrist. As a result, two persons in nurse practitioner

3Plaintiff has offered no evidence of a prima facie case. His summary judgment
responses addresses only the issue of pretext, completely ignoring his initial burden of proof
under the McDonnell Douglas analysis.

positions lost their jobs–Plaintiff and Julia Trice.

Plaintiff argues that the restructuring explanation is a pretext for discrimination and

presents two pieces of evidence to support his argument. First is a copy of job listings posted on

the NHSC website in March or April of 2007. Those listings show nurse practitioner openings

with AltaPointe at BayPointe and Mobile Infirmary. This evidence is rank hearsay, and for that

reason should not even be considered on summary judgment. See Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d

1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999) (explaining that hearsay evidence may be considered on summary

judgment only if it would fall within hearsay exception at trial). Even if the evidence were

admissible, these listings–dated more than a month after the discharge–prove nothing about the

availability of positions at the time of Plaintiff’s discharge. Plaintiff’s other pretext evidence is

several revised drafts of a letter from Dr. Ewing to the Alabama Board of Medical Examiners

(ABME). It appears that the drafts were prepared by Dr. Parker and Dr. Ewing.4 The purpose of

the letter was to inform the ABME that Dr. Ewing would no longer be Plaintiff’s supervising

physician. While the first draft stated that Plaintiff resigned from employment with Mobile

Mental Health Center (AltaPointe’s predecessor), subsequent drafts, and the final letter sent to

the ABME stated that Plaintiff’s job was eliminated due to restructuring. Plaintiff argues that

these drafts prove that Defendant has offered varying explanations for his termination and,

therefore, the reasons now proffered must be pretextual. What they actually demonstrate is

Defendant’s effort to ensure that Plaintiff’s termination would not be viewed in a negative light

by the ABME. No reasonable factfinder could conclude from this evidence that Defendant’s

4The drafts and revisions are contained in a series of emails between Dr. Ewing and Dr.
Parker’s assistant.

claim of restructuring was merely a pretext for gender discrimination.

Conclusion

In response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff has failed to present

sufficient evidence to support any of his gender discrimination claims. Accordingly, the motion

for summary judgment is due to be and hereby is GRANTED.

DONE and ORDERED this the 15th day of June, 2009.

s/Charles R. Butler, Jr.
Senior United States District Judge