Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams

(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER TERM, 2001

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING, KENTUCKY,
INC. v. WILLIAMS

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 00–1089. Argued November 7, 2001—Decided January 8, 2002

Claiming to be disabled from performing her automobile assembly line
job by carpal tunnel syndrome and related impairments, respondent
sued petitioner, her former employer, for failing to provide her with a
reasonable accommodation as required by the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U. S. C. §12112(b)(5)(A). The District
Court granted petitioner summary judgment, holding that respon-
dent’s impairment did not qualify as a “disability” under the ADA be-
cause it had not “substantially limit[ed]” any “major life activit[y],”
§12102(2)(A), and that there was no evidence that respondent had
had a record of a substantially limiting impairment or that petitioner
had regarded her as having such an impairment. The Sixth Circuit
reversed, finding that the impairments substantially limited respon-
dent in the major life activity of performing manual tasks. In order
to demonstrate that she was so limited, said the court, respondent
had to show that her manual disability involved a “class” of manual
activities affecting the ability to perform tasks at work. Respondent
satisfied this test, according to the court, because her ailments pre-
vented her from doing the tasks associated with certain types of
manual jobs that require the gripping of tools and repetitive work
with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder levels for ex-
tended periods of time. In reaching this conclusion, the court found
that evidence that respondent could tend to her personal hygiene and
carry out personal or household chores did not affect a determination
that her impairments substantially limited her ability to perform the
range of manual tasks associated with an assembly line job. The
court granted respondent partial summary judgment on the issue
whether she was disabled under the ADA.

TOYOTA MOTOR MFG., KY., INC. v. WILLIAMS

Syllabus

Held: The Sixth Circuit did not apply the proper standard in deter-
mining that respondent was disabled under the ADA because it ana-
lyzed only a limited class of manual tasks and failed to ask whether
respondent’s impairments prevented or restricted her from perform-
ing tasks that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives.
Pp. 7–18.
(a) The Court’s consideration of what an individual must prove to
demonstrate a substantial limitation in the major life activity of per-
forming manual tasks is guided by the ADA’s disability definition.
“Substantially” in the phrase “substantially limits” suggests “consid-
erable” or “to a large degree,” and thus clearly precludes impairments
that interfere in only a minor way with performing manual tasks. Cf.
Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U. S. 555, 565. Moreover, because
“major” means important, “major life activities” refers to those activi-
ties that are of central importance to daily life. In order for per-
forming manual tasks to fit into this category, the tasks in question
must be central to daily life. To be substantially limited in the spe-
cific major life activity of performing manual tasks, therefore, an in-
dividual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts
the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to
most people’s daily lives. The impairment’s impact must also be
permanent or long-term. See 29 CFR §§1630.2(j)(2)(ii–iii).
It is insufficient for individuals attempting to prove disability
status under this test to merely submit evidence of a medical diagno-
sis of an impairment. Instead, the ADA requires them to offer evi-
dence that the extent of the limitation caused by their impairment in
terms of their own experience is substantial. Id., at 567. That the
Act defines “disability” “with respect to an individual,” §12102(2),
makes clear that Congress intended the existence of a disability to be
determined in such a case-by-case manner. See, e.g., Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 527 U. S. 471, 483. An individualized assessment of
the effect of an impairment is particularly necessary when the im-
pairment is one such as carpal tunnel syndrome, in which symptoms
vary widely from person to person. Pp. 11–14.
(b) The Sixth Circuit erred in suggesting that, in order to prove a
substantial limitation in the major life activity of performing manual
tasks, a plaintiff must show that her manual disability involves a
“class” of manual activities, and that those activities affect the ability
to perform tasks at work. Nothing in the ADA’s text, this Court’s
opinions, or the regulations suggests that a class-based framework
should apply outside the context of the major life activity of working.
While the Sixth Circuit addressed the different major life activity of
performing manual tasks, its analysis erroneously circumvented Sut-
ton, supra, at 491, by focusing on respondent’s inability to perform

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Syllabus

manual tasks associated only with her job. Rather, the central in-
quiry must be whether the claimant is unable to perform the variety
of tasks central to most people’s daily lives. Also without support is
the Sixth Circuit’s assertion that the question whether an impair-
ment constitutes a disability is to be answered only by analyzing the
impairment’s effect in the workplace. That the Act’s “disability” defi-
nition applies not only to the portion of the ADA dealing with em-
ployment, but also to the other provisions dealing with public trans-
portation and public accommodations, demonstrates that the
definition is intended to cover individuals with disabling impair-
ments regardless of whether they have any connection to a work-
place. Moreover, because the manual tasks unique to any particular
job are not necessarily important parts of most people’s lives, occupa-
tion-specific tasks may have only limited relevance to the manual
task inquiry. In this case, repetitive work with hands and arms ex-
tended at or above shoulder levels for extended periods, the manual
task on which the Sixth Circuit relied, is not an important part of
most people’s daily lives. Household chores, bathing, and brushing
one’s teeth, in contrast, are among the types of manual tasks of cen-
tral importance to people’s daily lives, so the Sixth Circuit should not
have disregarded respondent’s ability to do these activities. Pp. 14–
17.
224 F. 3d 840, reversed and remanded.

O’CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

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Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 00–1089
_________________
TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING, KENTUCKY,
INC., PETITIONER v. ELLA WILLIAMS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[January 8, 2002]

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA
or Act), 104 Stat. 328, 42 U. S. C. §12101 et seq. (1994 ed.
and Supp. V), a physical impairment that “substantially
limits one or more . . . major life activities” is a “disability.”
42 U. S. C. §12102(2)(A) (1994 ed.). Respondent, claiming
to be disabled because of her carpal tunnel syndrome and
other related impairments, sued petitioner, her former
employer, for failing to provide her with a reasonable
accommodation as required by the ADA. See §12112(b)
(5)(A). The District Court granted summary judgment to
petitioner, finding that respondent’s impairments did not
substantially limit any of her major life activities. The
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding
that the impairments substantially limited respondent in
the major life activity of performing manual tasks, and
therefore granting partial summary judgment to respon-
dent on the issue of whether she was disabled under the
ADA. We conclude that the Court of Appeals did not apply
the proper standard in making this determination because
it analyzed only a limited class of manual tasks and failed
to ask whether respondent’s impairments prevented or

TOYOTA MOTOR MFG., KY., INC. v. WILLIAMS

Opinion of the Court

restricted her from performing tasks that are of central
importance to most people’s daily lives.
I
Respondent began working at petitioner’s automobile
manufacturing plant in Georgetown, Kentucky, in August
1990. She was soon placed on an engine fabrication as-
sembly line, where her duties included work with pneu-
matic tools. Use of these tools eventually caused pain in
respondent’s hands, wrists, and arms. She sought treat-
ment at petitioner’s in-house medical service, where she
was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and
bilateral tendinitis. Respondent consulted a personal
physician who placed her on permanent work restrictions
that precluded her from lifting more than 20 pounds or
from “frequently lifting or carrying of objects weighing up
to 10 pounds,” engaging in “constant repetitive . . . flexion
or extension of [her] wrists or elbows,” performing “over-
head work,” or using “vibratory or pneumatic tools.” Brief
for Respondent 2; App. 45–46.
In light of these restrictions, for the next two years
petitioner assigned respondent to various modified duty
jobs. Nonetheless, respondent missed some work for
medical leave, and eventually filed a claim under the
Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Act. Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §342.0011 et seq. (1997 and Supp. 2000). The par-
ties settled this claim, and respondent returned to work.
She was unsatisfied by petitioner’s efforts to accommodate
her work restrictions, however, and responded by bringing
an action in the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Kentucky alleging that petitioner had
violated the ADA by refusing to accommodate her disabil-
ity. That suit was also settled, and as part of the settle-
ment, respondent returned to work in December 1993.
Upon her return, petitioner placed respondent on a team
in Quality Control Inspection Operations (QCIO). QCIO is

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Opinion of the Court

responsible for four tasks: (1) “assembly paint”; (2) “paint
second inspection”; (3) “shell body audit”; and (4) “ED
surface repair.” App. 19. Respondent was initially placed
on a team that performed only the first two of these tasks,
and for a couple of years, she rotated on a weekly basis
between them.
In assembly paint, respondent visually
inspected painted cars moving slowly down a conveyor.
She scanned for scratches, dents, chips, or any other flaws
that may have occurred during the assembly or painting
process, at a rate of one car every 54 seconds. When re-
spondent began working in assembly paint, inspection
team members were required to open and shut the doors,
trunk, and/or hood of each passing car. Sometime during
respondent’s tenure, however, the position was modified to
include only visual inspection with few or no manual
tasks. Paint second inspection required team members to
use their hands to wipe each painted car with a glove as it
moved along a conveyor. Id., at 21–22. The parties agree
that respondent was physically capable of performing both
of these jobs and that her performance was satisfactory.
During the fall of 1996, petitioner announced that it
wanted QCIO employees to be able to rotate through all
Respondent therefore re-
four of the QCIO processes.
ceived training for the shell body audit job, in which team
members apply a highlight oil to the hood, fender, doors,
rear quarter panel, and trunk of passing cars at a rate of
approximately one car per minute. The highlight oil has
the viscosity of salad oil, and employees spread it on cars
with a sponge attached to a block of wood. After they wipe
each car with the oil, the employees visually inspect it for
flaws. Wiping the cars required respondent to hold her
hands and arms up around shoulder height for several
hours at a time.
A short while after the shell body audit job was added to
respondent’s rotations, she began to experience pain in her
neck and shoulders. Respondent again sought care at

TOYOTA MOTOR MFG., KY., INC. v. WILLIAMS

Opinion of the Court

petitioner’s in-house medical service, where she was diag-
nosed with myotendinitis bilateral periscapular, an in-
flammation of the muscles and tendons around both of her
shoulder blades; myotendinitis and myositis bilateral
forearms with nerve compression causing median nerve
irritation; and thoracic outlet compression, a condition
that causes pain in the nerves that lead to the upper
extremities. Respondent requested that petitioner ac-
commodate her medical conditions by allowing her
to return to doing only her original two jobs in QCIO,
which respondent claimed she could still perform without
difficulty.
The parties disagree about what happened next. Ac-
cording to respondent, petitioner refused her request and
forced her to continue working in the shell body audit job,
which caused her even greater physical injury. According
to petitioner, respondent simply began missing work on a
regular basis. Regardless, it is clear that on December 6,
1996, the last day respondent worked at petitioner’s plant,
she was placed under a no-work-of-any-kind restriction by
her treating physicians. On January 27, 1997, respondent
received a letter from petitioner that terminated her
employment, citing her poor attendance record.
Respondent filed a charge of disability discrimination
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). After receiving a right to sue letter, respondent
filed suit against petitioner in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. Her complaint
alleged that petitioner had violated the ADA and the
Kentucky Civil Rights Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §344.010 et
seq. (1997 and Supp. 2000), by failing to reasonably ac-
commodate her disability and by terminating her employ-
ment. Respondent later amended her complaint to also
allege a violation of of the Family and Medical Leave Act
of 1993 (FMLA), 107 Stat. 6, as amended, 29 U. S. C.
§2601 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V).

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Opinion of the Court

Respondent based her claim that she was “disabled”
under the ADA on the ground that her physical impair-
ments substantially limited her in (1) manual tasks; (2)
housework; (3) gardening; (4) playing with her children;
(5) lifting; and (6) working, all of which, she argued, con-
stituted major life activities under the Act. Respondent
also argued, in the alternative, that she was disabled
under the ADA because she had a record of a substantially
limiting impairment and because she was regarded as
having
such an
impairment.
See 42 U. S. C.
§§12102(2)(B–C) (1994 ed.).
After petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment
and respondent filed a motion for partial summary judg-
ment on her disability claims, the District Court granted
summary judgment to petitioner. Civ. A. No. 97–135 (Jan.
26, 1999), App. to Pet. for Cert. A–23. The court found
that respondent had not been disabled, as defined by the
ADA, at the time of petitioner’s alleged refusal to accom-
modate her, and that she had therefore not been covered
by the Act’s protections or by the Kentucky Civil Rights
Act, which is construed consistently with the ADA. Id., at
A–29, A–34 to A–47. The District Court held that respon-
dent had suffered from a physical impairment, but that
the impairment did not qualify as a disability because it
had not “substantially limit[ed]” any “major life activit[y],”
42 U. S. C. §12102(2)(A). App. to Pet. for Cert. A–34 to A–
42. The court rejected respondent’s arguments that gar-
dening, doing housework, and playing with children are
major life activities. Id., at A–35 to A–36. Although the
court agreed that performing manual tasks, lifting, and
working are major life activities, it found the evidence
insufficient to demonstrate that respondent had been
substantially limited in lifting or working. Id., at A–36 to
A–42. The court found respondent’s claim that she was
substantially limited in performing manual tasks to be
“irretrievably contradicted by [respondent’s] continual

TOYOTA MOTOR MFG., KY., INC. v. WILLIAMS

Opinion of the Court

insistence that she could perform the tasks in assembly
[paint] and paint [second] inspection without difficulty.”
Id., at A–36. The court also found no evidence that re-
spondent had had a record of a substantially limiting
impairment, id., at A–43, or that petitioner had regarded
her as having such an impairment, id., at A–46 to A–47.
The District Court also rejected respondent’s claim that
her termination violated the ADA and the Kentucky Civil
Rights Act. The court found that even if it assumed that
respondent was disabled at the time of her termination,
she was not a “qualified individual with a disability,” 42
U. S. C. §12111(8) (1994 ed.), because, at that time, her
physicians had restricted her from performing work of any
kind, App. to Pet. for Cert. A–47 to A–50. Finally, the
court found that respondent’s FMLA claim failed, because
she had not presented evidence that she had suffered any
damages available under the FMLA. Id., at A–50 to A–54.
Respondent appealed all but the gardening, housework,
and playing-with-children rulings. The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court’s ruling
on whether respondent was disabled at the time she
sought an accommodation, but affirmed the District
Court’s rulings on respondent’s FMLA and wrongful ter-
mination claims. 224 F. 3d 840 (2000). The Court of
Appeals held that in order for respondent to demonstrate
that she was disabled due to a substantial limitation in
the ability to perform manual tasks at the time of her
accommodation request, she had to “show that her manual
disability involve[d] a ‘class’ of manual activities affecting
the ability to perform tasks at work.” Id., at 843. Respon-
dent satisfied this test, according to the Court of Appeals,
because her ailments “prevent[ed] her from doing the
tasks associated with certain types of manual assembly
line jobs, manual product handling jobs and manual
building trade jobs (painting, plumbing, roofing, etc.) that
require the gripping of tools and repetitive work with

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Opinion of the Court

hands and arms extended at or above shoulder levels for
extended periods of time.” Ibid. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court disregarded evidence that respondent could
“ten[d] to her personal hygiene [and] carr[y] out personal
or household chores,” finding that such evidence “does not
affect a determination that her impairment substantially
limit[ed] her ability to perform the range of manual tasks
associated with an assembly line job,” ibid. Because the
Court of Appeals concluded that respondent had been
substantially limited in performing manual tasks and, for
that reason, was entitled to partial summary judgment on
the issue of whether she was disabled under the Act, it
found that it did not need to determine whether respon-
dent had been substantially limited in the major life ac-
tivities of lifting or working, ibid., or whether she had had
a “record of” a disability or had been “regarded as” dis-
abled, id., at 844.
We granted certiorari, 532 U. S. 970 (2001), to consider
the proper standard for assessing whether an individual is
substantially limited in performing manual tasks. We
now reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision to grant partial
summary judgment to respondent on the issue whether
she was substantially limited in performing manual tasks
at the time she sought an accommodation. We express no
opinion on the working, lifting, or other arguments for
disability status that were preserved below but which
were not ruled upon by the Court of Appeals.
II
The ADA requires covered entities, including private
employers, to provide “reasonable accommodations to the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant
or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate
that the accommodation would impose an undue hard-
ship.” 42 U. S. C. §12112(b)(5)(A) (1994 ed.); see also

TOYOTA MOTOR MFG., KY., INC. v. WILLIAMS

Opinion of the Court

§12111(2) (“The term ‘covered entity’ means an employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-
management committee”). The Act defines a “qualified
individual with a disability” as “an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable accommoda-
tion, can perform the essential functions of the employ-
ment position that such individual holds or desires.”
§12111(8). In turn, a “disability” is:
“(A) a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual;
“(B) a record of such an impairment; or
“(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”
§12102(2).
There are two potential sources of guidance for inter-
preting the terms of this definition—the regulations inter-
preting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 361, as
amended, 29 U. S. C. §706(8)(B) (1988 ed.), and the EEOC
regulations interpreting the ADA. Congress drew the
ADA’s definition of disability almost verbatim from the
definition of “handicapped individual” in the Rehabilita-
tion Act, §706(8)(B), and Congress’ repetition of a well-
established term generally implies that Congress intended
the term to be construed in accordance with pre-existing
regulatory interpretations. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U. S.
624, 631 (1998); FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U. S.
426, 437–438 (1986); ICC v. Parker, 326 U. S. 60, 65 (1945).
As we explained in Bragdon v. Abbott, supra, at 631, Con-
gress did more in the ADA than suggest this construc-
tion; it adopted a specific statutory provision directing as
follows:
“Except as otherwise provided in this chapter,
nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a
lesser standard than the standards applied under title
V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U. S. C. 790 et

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Opinion of the Court

seq.) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies
pursuant to such title.” 42 U. S. C. §12201(a) (1994
ed.)
The persuasive authority of the EEOC regulations is
less clear. As we have previously noted, see Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U. S. 471, 479 (1999), no
agency has been given authority to issue regulations
interpreting the term “disability” in the ADA. Nonethe-
less, the EEOC has done so. See 29 CFR §§1630.2(g)–(j)
(2001). Because both parties accept the EEOC regulations
as reasonable, we assume without deciding that they are,
and we have no occasion to decide what level of deference,
if any, they are due. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
supra, at 480; Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U. S.
555, 563, n. 10 (1999).
To qualify as disabled under subsection (A) of the ADA’s
definition of disability, a claimant must initially prove
that he or she has a physical or mental impairment. See
42 U. S. C. §12102(2)(A). The Rehabilitation Act regula-
tions issued by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) in 1977, which appear without change in
the current regulations issued by the Department of
Health and Human Services, define “physical impair-
ment,” the type of impairment relevant to this case, to
mean “any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of
the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal;
special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs;
cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary;
hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine.” 45 CFR
§84.3(j)(2)(i) (2001). The HEW regulations are of particu-
lar significance because at the time they were issued,
HEW was the agency responsible for coordinating the
implementation and enforcement of §504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act, 29 U. S. C. §794 (1994 ed. and Supp. V), which

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Opinion of the Court

prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties by recipients of federal financial assistance. Bragdon
v. Abbott, supra, at 632 (citing Consolidated Rail Corpora-
tion v. Darrone, 465 U. S. 624, 634 (1984)).
Merely having an impairment does not make one dis-
abled for purposes of the ADA. Claimants also need to
demonstrate that the impairment limits a major life ac-
tivity. See 42 U. S. C. §12102(2)(A) (1994 ed.). The HEW
Rehabilitation Act regulations provide a list of examples of
“major life activities,” that includes “walking, seeing,
hearing,” and, as relevant here, “performing manual
tasks.” 45 CFR §84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2001).
To qualify as disabled, a claimant must further show
that the limitation on the major life activity is “substan-
tia[l].” 42 U. S. C. §12102(2)(A). Unlike “physical im-
pairment” and “major life activities,” the HEW regulations
do not define the term “substantially limits.” See Nondis-
crimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and
Activities Receiving or Benefiting from Federal Financial
Assistance, 42 Fed. Reg. 22676, 22685 (1977) (stating the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s position
that a definition of “substantially limits” was not possible at
that time). The EEOC, therefore, has created its own defini-
tion for purposes of the ADA. According to the EEOC regu-
lations, “substantially limit[ed]” means “[u]nable to perform
a major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform”; or “[s]ignificantly restricted as to
the condition, manner or duration under which an individ-
ual can perform a particular major life activity as compared
to the condition, manner, or duration under which the
average person in the general population can perform that
same major life activity.” 29 CFR §1630.2(j) (2001). In
determining whether an individual is substantially limited
in a major life activity, the regulations instruct that the
following factors should be considered: “[t]he nature and
severity of the impairment; [t]he duration or expected dura-

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Opinion of the Court

tion of the impairment; and [t]he permanent or long-term
impact, or the expected permanent or long-term impact of or
resulting from the impairment.” §§1630.2(j)(2)(i)–(iii).
III
The question presented by this case is whether the Sixth
Circuit properly determined that respondent was disabled
under subsection (A) of the ADA’s disability definition at
the time that she sought an accommodation from peti-
tioner. 42 U. S. C. §12102(2)(A). The parties do not dis-
pute that respondent’s medical conditions, which include
carpal tunnel syndrome, myotendinitis, and thoracic outlet
compression, amount to physical impairments. The rele-
vant question, therefore, is whether the Sixth Circuit
correctly analyzed whether these impairments substan-
tially limited respondent in the major life activity of per-
forming manual tasks. Answering this requires us to
address an issue about which the EEOC regulations are
silent: what a plaintiff must demonstrate to establish a
substantial limitation in the specific major life activity of
performing manual tasks.
Our consideration of this issue is guided first and fore-
most by the words of the disability definition itself.
“[S]ubstantially” in the phrase “substantially limits” sug-
gests “considerable” or “to a large degree.” See Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1976) (defining
“substantially” as “in a substantial manner” and “substan-
tial” as “considerable in amount, value, or worth” and
“being that specified to a large degree or in the main”); see
also 17 Oxford English Dictionary 66–67 (2d ed. 1989)
(“substantial”: “[r]elating to or proceeding from the es-
sence of a thing; essential”; “[o]f ample or considerable
amount, quantity, or dimensions”). The word “substan-
tial” thus clearly precludes impairments that interfere in
only a minor way with the performance of manual tasks
from qualifying as disabilities. Cf. Albertson’s, Inc. v.

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Opinion of the Court

Kirkingburg, 527 U. S., at 565 (explaining that a “mere
difference” does not amount to a “significant restric[tion]”
and therefore does not satisfy the EEOC’s interpretation
of “substantially limits”).
“Major” in the phrase “major life activities” means im-
portant. See Webster’s, supra, at 1363 (defining “major”
as “greater in dignity, rank, importance, or interest”).
“Major life activities” thus refers to those activities that
are of central importance to daily life. In order for per-
forming manual tasks to fit into this category—a category
that includes such basic abilities as walking, seeing, and
hearing—the manual tasks in question must be central to
daily life. If each of the tasks included in the major life
activity of performing manual tasks does not independ-
ently qualify as a major life activity, then together they
must do so.
That these terms need to be interpreted strictly to cre-
ate a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled is
confirmed by the first section of the ADA, which lays out
the legislative findings and purposes that motivate the
Act. See 42 U. S. C. §12101. When it enacted the ADA in
1990, Congress found that “some 43,000,000 Americans
have one or more physical or mental disabilities.”
§12101(a)(1). If Congress intended everyone with a physi-
cal impairment that precluded the performance of some
isolated, unimportant, or particularly difficult manual
task to qualify as disabled, the number of disabled Ameri-
cans would surely have been much higher. Cf. Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U. S., at 487 (finding that be-
cause more than 100 million people need corrective lenses to
see properly, “[h]ad Congress intended to include all persons
with corrected physical limitations among those covered by
the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a much higher
number [than 43 million disabled persons in the findings”).
We therefore hold that to be substantially limited in
performing manual tasks, an individual must have an

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Opinion of the Court

impairment that prevents or severely restricts the indi-
vidual from doing activities that are of central importance
to most people’s daily lives. The impairment’s impact
must also be permanent or long-term. See 29 CFR
§§1630.2(j)(2)(ii)–(iii) (2001).
It is insufficient for individuals attempting to prove
disability status under this test to merely submit evidence
of a medical diagnosis of an impairment. Instead, the
ADA requires those “claiming the Act’s protection . . . to
prove a disability by offering evidence that the extent of
the limitation [caused by their impairment] in terms of
their own experience . . . is substantial.” Albertson’s, Inc.
v. Kirkingburg, supra, at 567 (holding that monocular
vision is not invariably a disability, but must be analyzed
on an individual basis, taking into account the individual’s
ability to compensate for the impairment). That the Act
defines “disability” “with respect to an individual,” 42
U. S. C. §12102(2), makes clear that Congress intended
the existence of a disability to be determined in such a
case-by-case manner. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
supra, at 483; Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, supra, at
566; cf. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U. S., at 641–642 (relying
on unchallenged testimony that the respondent’s HIV
infection controlled her decision not to have a child, and
declining to consider whether HIV infection is a per se
disability under the ADA); 29 CFR pt. 1630, App.
§1630.2(j) (2001) (“The determination of whether an indi-
vidual has a disability is not necessarily based on the
name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but
rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the
individual”); ibid. (“The determination of whether an
individual is substantially limited in a major life activity
must be made on a case-by-case basis”).
An individualized assessment of the effect of an im-
pairment is particularly necessary when the impairment
is one whose symptoms vary widely from person to person.

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Opinion of the Court

Carpal tunnel syndrome, one of respondent’s impairments,
is just such a condition. While cases of severe carpal
tunnel syndrome are characterized by muscle atrophy and
extreme sensory deficits, mild cases generally do not have
either of these effects and create only intermittent symp-
toms of numbness and tingling. Carniero, Carpal Tunnel
Syndrome: The Cause Dictates the Treatment 66 Cleve-
land Clinic J. Medicine 159, 161–162 (1999). Studies have
further shown that, even without surgical treatment, one
quarter of carpal tunnel cases resolve in one month, but
that in 22 percent of cases, symptoms last for eight years
or longer. See DeStefano, Nordstrom, & Uierkant, Long-
term Symptom Outcomes of Carpal Tunnel Syndrome and
its Treatment, 22A J. Hand Surgery 200, 204–205 (1997).
When pregnancy is the cause of carpal tunnel syndrome,
in contrast, the symptoms normally resolve within two
weeks of delivery. See Ouellette, Nerve Compression
Syndromes of the Upper Extremity in Women, 17 Journal
of Musculoskeletal Medicine 536 (2000). Given these large
potential differences in the severity and duration of the
effects of carpal tunnel syndrome, an individual’s carpal
tunnel syndrome diagnosis, on its own, does not indicate
whether the individual has a disability within the mean-
ing of the ADA.

IV
The Court of Appeals’ analysis of respondent’s claimed
disability suggested that in order to prove a substantial
limitation in the major life activity of performing manual
tasks, a “plaintiff must show that her manual disability
involves a ‘class’ of manual activities,” and that those
activities “affec[t] the ability to perform tasks at work.”
See 224 F. 3d, at 843. Both of these ideas lack support.
The Court of Appeals relied on our opinion in Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., for the idea that a “class” of manual
activities must be implicated for an impairment to sub-

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stantially limit the major life activity of performing man-
ual tasks. 224 F. 3d, at 843. But Sutton said only that
“[w]hen the major life activity under consideration is that
of working, the statutory phrase ‘substantially limits’
requires . . . that plaintiffs allege that they are unable to
work in a broad class of jobs.” 527 U. S., at 491 (emphasis
added). Because of the conceptual difficulties inherent in
the argument that working could be a major life activity,
we have been hesitant to hold as much, and we need not
decide this difficult question today. In Sutton, we noted
that even assuming that working is a major life activity, a
claimant would be required to show an inability to work in
a “broad range of jobs,” rather than a specific job. Id., at
492. But Sutton did not suggest that a class-based analy-
sis should be applied to any major life activity other than
working. Nor do the EEOC regulations. In defining “sub-
stantially limits,” the EEOC regulations only mention the
“class” concept in the context of the major life activity of
working. 29 CFR §1630.2(j)(3) (2001) (“With respect to the
major life activity of working[,] [t]he term substantially
limits means significantly restricted in the ability to per-
form either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in vari-
ous classes as compared to the average person having
comparable training, skills and abilities”). Nothing in the
text of the Act, our previous opinions, or the regulations
suggests that a class-based framework should apply out-
side the context of the major life activity of working.
While the Court of Appeals in this case addressed the
different major life activity of performing manual tasks,
its analysis circumvented Sutton by focusing on respon-
dent’s inability to perform manual tasks associated only
with her job. This was error. When addressing the major
life activity of performing manual tasks, the central in-
quiry must be whether the claimant is unable to perform
the variety of tasks central to most people’s daily lives, not
whether the claimant is unable to perform the tasks asso-

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Opinion of the Court

ciated with her specific job. Otherwise, Sutton’s restric-
tion on claims of disability based on a substantial limita-
tion in working will be rendered meaningless because an
inability to perform a specific job always can be recast as
an inability to perform a “class” of tasks associated with
that specific job.
There is also no support in the Act, our previous opin-
ions, or the regulations for the Court of Appeals’ idea that
the question of whether an impairment constitutes a
disability is to be answered only by analyzing the effect of
the impairment in the workplace. Indeed, the fact that
the Act’s definition of “disability” applies not only to Title I
of the Act, 42 U. S. C. §§12111–12117 (1994 ed.), which
deals with employment, but also to the other portions of
the Act, which deal with subjects such as public transpor-
tation, §§12141–12150, 42 U. S. C. §§12161–12165 (1994
ed. and Supp. V), and privately provided public accommo-
dations, §§12181–12189, demonstrates that the definition
is intended to cover individuals with disabling impair-
ments regardless of whether the individuals have any
connection to a workplace.
Even more critically, the manual tasks unique to any
particular job are not necessarily important parts of most
people’s lives. As a result, occupation-specific tasks may
have only limited relevance to the manual task inquiry. In
this case, “repetitive work with hands and arms extended
at or above shoulder levels for extended periods of time,”
224 F. 3d, at 843, the manual task on which the Court of
Appeals relied, is not an important part of most people’s
daily lives. The court, therefore, should not have consid-
ered respondent’s inability to do such manual work in her
specialized assembly line job as sufficient proof that she
was substantially limited in performing manual tasks.
At the same time, the Court of Appeals appears to have
disregarded the very type of evidence that it should have
focused upon.
It treated as irrelevant “[t]he fact that

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Opinion of the Court

[respondent] can . . . ten[d] to her personal hygiene [and]
carr[y] out personal or household chores.”
Yet
Ibid.
household chores, bathing, and brushing one’s teeth are
among the types of manual tasks of central importance to
people’s daily lives, and should have been part of the
assessment of whether respondent was substantially
limited in performing manual tasks.
The District Court noted that at the time respondent
sought an accommodation from petitioner, she admitted
that she was able to do the manual tasks required by her
original two jobs in QCIO. App. to Pet. for Cert. A–36. In
addition, according to respondent’s deposition testimony,
even after her condition worsened, she could still brush
her teeth, wash her face, bathe, tend her flower garden, fix
breakfast, do laundry, and pick up around the house. App.
32–34. The record also indicates that her medical condi-
tions caused her to avoid sweeping, to quit dancing, to
occasionally seek help dressing, and to reduce how often
she plays with her children, gardens, and drives long
distances. Id., at 32, 38–39. But these changes in her life
did not amount to such severe restrictions in the activities
that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives
that they establish a manual-task disability as a matter of
law. On this record, it was therefore inappropriate for the
Court of Appeals to grant partial summary judgment to
respondent on the issue whether she was substantially
limited in performing manual tasks, and its decision to do
so must be reversed.
In its brief on the merits, petitioner asks us to reinstate
the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to peti-
tioner on the manual task issue. In its petition for certio-
rari, however, petitioner did not seek summary judgment;
it argued only that the Court of Appeals’ reasons for
granting partial summary judgment to respondent were
unsound. This Court’s Rule 14(1)(a) provides: “Only the
questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein,

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Opinion of the Court

will be considered by the Court.” The question whether
petitioner was entitled to summary judgment on the man-
ual task issue is therefore not properly before us. See
Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, 129–130 (1954).
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment
granting partial summary judgment to respondent and
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

So ordered.