Burns v. Georgetown Univ. Med. Ctr. — Aug. 2016 (Summary)

FELLOWSHIP

Burns v. Georgetown Univ. Med. Ctr.
Civil Action No. 13-898 (CKK) (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2016)

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted a hospital and medical center’s motion for summary judgment in a suit brought by a former participant in a fellowship program, dismissing the fellow’s three contract-based claims as well as her three tort-based claims.

The fellow, who upon beginning her fellowship was an active duty member of the military, and her branch of service both entered into an agreement with the medical center prior to the fellow beginning the fellowship program. Eight months later, the fellow was handed a letter stating that she was being terminated, effective immediately, and per the fellow’s Fellowship Agreement, her branch of service would be notified. After negotiations, the fellow was allowed to submit a back-dated resignation letter. Subsequently, a second termination letter was given to the fellow, on the medical center’s letterhead, as well as the fellow’s branch of service. In response, the branch of service sent a form to the hospital asking if the fellow had ever been punished, to which the hospital responded yes and sent a Final Summative Assessment regarding the fellow’s time in the program.

With respect to the fellow’s contract-based claims, the court concluded that summary judgment in favor of the hospital was appropriate because the hospital was not a party to any of the contracts that formed the basis of the fellow’s claims. The court reasoned that an unambiguous reading of the contract at issue dictated an agreement between the fellow’s branch of service and the medical center. Additionally, the court rejected the fellow’s claim that the medical center breached the agreement by terminating the fellow without due process, failing to provide 30-day notice before the termination, and failing to provide a competent fellowship training program. The court concluded that the contract did not contain a due process requirement, there was no termination because the medical center allowed the fellow to retroactively exit the contract prior to her termination, and the contract contained no guarantee of a competent training program. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment on all three of the fellow’s contract-based claims.

The court also granted the hospital and medical center summary judgment on the fellow’s two defamation claims based on the last two forms sent to her branch of service and the intentional interference claim based on a theory of common interest privilege, which barred the defamation claims. The court maintained that the fellow was unable to overcome the common interest privilege because the record did not support her allegation of malice. The contents of the final documents delivered to her branch of service in the court’s eyes contained nothing more than a critical assessment of the fellow’s performance in professional language, which, consequently, did not rise to the level of defamation. Also, the court rejected the fellow’s argument that the final correspondence delivered to her branch of service was sent to interfere with her prospective economic advantage in her employment because the fellow was relying on future relations with her employer, which was speculative at best. Therefore, the court also granted summary judgment on the fellow’s additional tort-based claims.