Murphy v. Goss – April 2015 (Summary)

HCQIA IMMUNITY – NPDB REPORTING

Murphy v. Goss, No. 3:14-cv-01135-SI (D. Or. Apr. 16, 2015), aff’d, No. 15-35397 (9th Cir. July 11, 2017)

This case involves a cardiac anesthesiologist who consumed one to two glasses of wine while at a restaurant and while on call. The cardiac anesthesiologist was found by the state medical board to have engaged in unprofessional conduct. In turn, the state medical board reported the cardiac anesthesiologist to the National Practitioner Data Bank (“NPDB”). While the cardiac anesthesiologist did not challenge the validity of the state medical board’s determination, he alleged that it violated his due process rights when it answered “Yes” in response to the NPDB’s question: “Is the Adverse Action Specified in This Report Based on the Subject’s Professional Competence or Conduct, Which Adversely Affected, or Could Have Adversely Affected, the Health or Welfare of the Patient?”

In a prior opinion, Murphy v. Goss, No. 3:14-cv-01135-SI (D. Or. Jan. 26, 2015), the United States District Court for the District of Oregon dismissed (without prejudice) the cardiac anesthesiologist’s substantive due process claim against several members of a state medical board on the basis that those individuals were entitled to immunity under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (“HCQIA”) since the cardiac anesthesiologist did not allege that any of them had knowledge of the falsity of any report made to the NPDB.

In this more recent opinion in the same case, Murphy v. Goss, No. 3:14-cv-01135-SI (D. Or. Apr. 16, 2015), the court once again considered whether the cardiac anesthesiologist could pursue his claims against the state board and its members. In granting summary judgment to the state board and its members, again on the basis of HCQIA immunity, the court noted that there was no evidence that anyone at the state board had knowledge of the falsity of the NPDB report. The court rejected the cardiac anesthesiologist’s assertion that he should be permitted to proceed through discovery to trial, where a jury could decide whether to believe the state board employee (who declared that she had no actual knowledge that the report was false) or believe the cardiac anesthesiologist’s unsupported accusation that the employee did know that the report was false. According to the court, “[s]tanding alone, the mere assertion by Plaintiff that one of the Defendants had actual knowledge that the report was false is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.”