Kaufman v. Columbia Mem’l Hosp. (Summary)
EMPLOYMENT — TERMINATION
Kaufman v. Columbia Mem’l Hosp., No. 1:11-CV-667 (MAD/CFH) (N.D. N.Y. Aug. 7, 2014)
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York granted in part and denied in part a physician’s motion in limine and denied the hospital’s motion in limine without prejudice.
The physician alleged that the hospital violated the terms of their employment agreement by suspending him, terminating him, and denying his renewal for medical staff privileges without due process. The hospital argued that there was just cause to justify the physician’s termination, including the physician’s incompetence. The hospital also brought counterclaims of unjust enrichment, alleging that it is entitled to the advance payment the physician received during his suspension. Both parties submitted requests to dismiss portions of the other party’s evidence.
The court denied the physician’s request to preclude any evidence related to his competency to safely practice medicine, holding that the issue was relevant to determine if the hospital did, in fact, have just cause for his termination. The court also denied the physician’s motion to bar certain out-of-court statements referring to his alleged incompetence. Because the court did not know the specific content or context of the statements, it was unable to make a definitive ruling. However, it indicated that statements may be permitted to demonstrate that the hospital’s opinion toward the physician was fair and reasonable. The physician’s motion to preclude the introduction of other doctors’ testimony toward his competence was also denied. Though the witnesses have not been proffered as experts, it is commonly held that physicians may testify as to their opinions of other physicians’ competence. While one of the doctors sought as a witness never worked alongside the physician, the court found that his opinion may still be relevant to determine whether the hospital acted fairly and reasonably in the termination of the physician.
The court did grant the physician’s request to preclude the introduction of evidence regarding prior malpractice settlements. It was determined that allowing such evidence would be highly prejudicial, and could spiral into a “series of mini-trials over allegations of malpractice.” The court also granted the physician’s request to bar the hospital from introducing evidence of a promissory note, as it was not relevant to the issue at trial.
The hospital requested that the court exclude all evidence relating to discrimination. The court denied this request, finding that the hospital’s request lacked sufficient specificity. Additionally, the court determined that the physician would be able to introduce evidence to show that the hospital’s actions were not fair and reasonable, but motivated by discriminatory bias.